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My Philosophical Position Says \( \neg p \)
and I Don’t Believe \( p \)

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INTRODUCTION

There is typically something strange about asserting or believing Moore-paradoxical sentences. In this paper I want to harness this strangeness to do a particular kind of philosophical work. I will argue that various prominent philosophers are committed to asserting and believing various Moore-paradoxical sentences in virtue of the very philosophical positions that they hold. Some of the philosophers in question may be surprised to learn of their commitment and find it unwelcome; others may not be troubled by their commitment and claim that not all Moore sentences are paradoxical after all; still others may positively celebrate their commitment and the paradoxicality, perhaps in the name of notoriety or boldness of thought. In any case, observing the commitment may help lay bare what we find peculiar in these philosophical positions, where previously we may only have had vague feelings of unease; or we may regard the Moore-paradoxical commitments as further reductions of the positions; or we may conclude that not all Moore sentences are paradoxical after all. Whichever way things go, I hope that some philosophical progress will be made. Along the way, I will consider some philosophical positions that may not actually have been held by any philosopher, prominent or otherwise, but that still have some interesting Moorish consequences.

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MOORE SENTENCES, AND MORE SENTENCES
(OF THE SAME KIND)

We begin with the canonical versions\(^1\) of Moore sentences—sentences of the form:

(1) \( p \) and I believe that not-\( p \).
(2) \( p \) and I don’t believe that \( p \).

In very much the same spirit, we have:

(3) \( p \) and I believe that ‘\( p \)’ is not true.
(4) \( p \) and I don’t believe that ‘\( p \)’ is true.

In fact there is a spectrum of sentences displaying the same peculiarity to varying degrees. For example:

(5) \( p \) and I assign ‘\( p \)’ low probability.
(6) \( p \) and I assign ‘\( p \)’ middling probability.
(7) \( p \) and I don’t assign ‘\( p \)’ high probability.

Along the way we will encounter further sentences that are similarly anomalous.

The simplest way to reveal the varying degrees of oddity of such sentences is to begin with the idea that in asserting \( p \), one represents oneself as knowing that \( p \). (Cf. Unger 1975; Slove 1979; De Rose 1991; Williamson 1996.) But the smaller the probability that one assigns to \( p \), the further one is from believing and a fortiori from knowing that \( p \), and thus the greater is the discrepancy between how one represents oneself by an assertion of \( p \), and how one represents oneself by an assertion of a probability assignment to \( p \).

Even if we do not accept this rather stringent account of an assertion, we can surely agree that in asserting \( p \), one conveys at least reasonable confidence in \( p \)—one conveys at least a moderately high subjective probability assignment to \( p \). (Cf. Lewis 1976.) But one sends mixed messages by conveying also that this subjective probability is low, or middling, or not moderately high. After all, probability functions, even subjective probability functions, are functions: they cannot assign two different values to the same proposition. So there is apparently no way of interpreting someone who utters (5)–(7) as having a single probability assignment for \( p \). And the lower the probability stated in the second conjunct, the harder this task of interpretation becomes. (Note that it is not strange in the same way to say

\( p \), and ‘\( p \)’ is probable,

since both conjuncts send the same message of confidence in \( p \). Strangely wordy, perhaps—but not strange in the same way.)

Thus, if you assert any of (1)–(7), you apparently represent yourself to others as having a certain attitude to the world, which you then undermine or contradict with the representation of another attitude. But Moore’s paradox is as much a puzzle for belief as it is for assertion. And it would be equally puzzling to represent yourself to yourself in any of these ways—by believing any of these sentences. Moreover, it should seem puzzling for you to believe something that entails any such sentence—thus implicitly committing yourself to the truth of the sentence—if the entailment is easily recognized.

The lore has it that asserting or believing Moore-paradoxical sentences is problematic. And yet a number of philosophers are implicitly committed to doing both in virtue of the philosophical positions that they espouse: things that they explicitly say entail instances of (1)–(7), where the entailments are easily recognized. If we alert them to their commitment to Moore-paradoxical sentences, they should either assert and believe these sentences—which many, following Moore, find ‘absurd’—or rethink their philosophical positions.

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS WITH
MOORE-PARADOXICAL CONSEQUENCES

‘There are no beliefs’

Churchland (1981) and Stich (1983) are skeptical about the very notion of belief. ‘Belief’ is part of a suspect folk psychology, likely to go the way of phlogiston and vital spirits—that is, ultimately to be discarded by science. On this view, neither I, nor you, nor anybody else ever has, ever had, or ever will have beliefs. Rather, we have whatever mental items will be postulated by a fully developed psychological theory. Thus, Churchland and Stich are committed to uttering sentences such as:

‘It is raining and I don’t believe that it is raining (and neither do you, nor anybody else, for “belief” is part of a suspect theory of the mental).’

We have an easy way of generating sentences of type (2).

Now, Churchland and Stich would surely not be fazed by this gambit—nor by the putative reductio that ‘they offer a philosophical position that, by their own lights, they don’t really believe!’ The right thing for them to say, of course, is

\(^1\) There are non-canonical instances of the same puzzling phenomenon—e.g. ‘God knows that I am an atheist’ (Sorensen 1988). Conversely, there are non-puzzling instances of Moorean-looking sentences: for example, ‘it is raining, and I don’t believe that there is precipitation’, uttered by someone who does not know what the word ‘precipitation’ means. More generally, someone may not know that the sentence denoted by ‘\( p \)’ expresses or is implied by the proposition \( p \). Thus, a sentence’s having the canonical Moorean syntax is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being Moore-paradoxical. I will not attempt to give an analysis of just what Moore-paradoxicality consists in. Instead, I will play the justice Stewart defense, resting content with knowing the phenomenon when I see it; moreover, I believe that all the examples I adduce clearly display it. I thank John Williams for discussion on this point.
that their mental state regarding the rain, or their own position, is whatever the fully developed psychological theory postulates it to be. Still, their commitment to Moore sentences is genuine, as is the puzzlement that it may induce in many of the rest of us. And we see our first trick for generating Moore sentences, one that we will see again: subject belief to different standards from those for (sincere, warranted) assertion. Indeed, according to Churchland’s and Stich’s standards for belief, nothing meets them: nobody ever had, ever has, or ever will have a belief. Yet presumably their standards for assertion are the usual ones. Thus, on their view, one may succeed in asserting something (sincerely and with warrant) while lacking a belief in that thing.

Now suppose that you are not totally convinced by Churchland and Stich, but you think that it is at least an open question—something else close to Moore’s heart—whether or not they are right. It seems that you are committed to sentences such as:

‘It is raining, and it is an open question whether I believe it is raining (and whether you do, and whether anybody else does, for it is an open question whether Churchland and Stich are right)’

and perhaps:

‘It is raining, and I am agnostic about whether I believe it is raining…’

These, too, sound pretty Moorish. If you want to avoid such a predicament, you should not be even agnostic about whether Churchland and Stich are right. Not that they would welcome this talk of agnosticism either, since presumably by their lights it is another folk psychological notion to be jettisoned. So if you really want to keep an open mind regarding their position, perhaps even the latter sentence is too commital. Better to play it safe:

‘It is raining, and it is an open question whether I am agnostic about whether I believe it is raining…’

And so on.

Churchland’s and Stich’s position is programmatic; they await the details of a fully developed psychological theory. Let me go out on a limb and suggest one way that things could conceivably go. Psychology could adopt wholesale the terms of Bayesianism, eschewing talk of beliefs in favor of subjective probabilities. There is already this tendency in the work of Jeffrey (e.g. 1968), who seeks to replace the concept of knowledge with that of subjective probability, thus downplaying skeptical concerns about knowledge. Pushing this further, a Jeffrey-inspired psychologist might insist that ‘belief’ cannot simply be reduced to subjective probability (citing, perhaps, the lottery and preface paradoxes, of which more shortly), and that subjective probability is the proper doxastic notion: folk psychology should be eliminated in favor of Bayesianism. Then speaking in his capacity as eliminativist, the psychologist may well say:

‘It is raining, and I don’t believe that it is raining (instead, I assign high subjective probability to it raining).’

‘Beliefs are propositions assigned subjective probability 1’ or ‘…very high subjective probability’

On the Churchland/Stich/Jeffrey-inspired psychologist view, beliefs are much harder to come by than you might think (since earning their keep in a mature psychological theory is a tough standard to meet) — so much so that there simply aren’t any. But we need not adopt positions as radical as theirs in order to generate Moore sentences. It suffices to adopt unusually high standards for belief while keeping normal standards for sincere, warranted assertion. Thus, we might be less demanding than Churchland, Stich, and the Jeffrey-inspired psychologist about the notion of belief, but demanding enough. For example, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2004) argue that ‘S believes that p’ should be analyzed as ‘S assigns subjective probability 1 to p’. Beliefs do exist on this view, but still they are harder to come by than you might think. If sincere, warranted assertions remain as easy to come by as you think, we can find propositions that make the cut for assertion, but that do not make the cut for belief, so understood. For such a proposition p, presumably S may properly assert p while disavowing belief in it. We might be moved by the lottery paradox, for example, to say that no threshold of subjective probability below 1 is sufficiently high to count as belief: you don’t really believe that your ticket will lose, you merely assign it probability 0.999999 of doing so. As long as a lower threshold suffices for (sincere, warranted) assertion, the conditions for Moore sentences are in place. Thus, it apparently becomes reasonable to say:

‘My ticket will lose (I assert this because my probability is above the threshold for assertion), but I don’t believe that my ticket will lose (since my probability falls below the threshold of 1 for belief).’

We may lower the standard for belief while arguably maintaining some daylight between the new standard and that for warranted assertion — and this still suffices to generate Moore-paradoxical sentences. Suppose that we set the bar for belief not at probability 1, as Hawthorne and Weatherson did, but at

\footnote{I say ‘presumably’ because I assume that even qua eliminativists, Churchland and Stich feel free to assert things very much as the rest of us do — after all, even their philosophical works on eliminativism are full of assertions, any one of which I could use to make my point. To be sure, assertion is usually characterized in terms of its role as the (purposed) expression of belief, or in similar mentalistic terms. An eliminativist account of assertion would presumably look rather different. The mentalistic adjective ‘sincerely’ may similarly require an eliminativist gloss. (Thanks here to an anonymous referee for this volume.)}

\footnote{Kyburg (1961).}
0.999. Plausibly, various sentences will still clear the bar for assertability, but not the bar for belief. As it might be: 'the pubs are open (I am entitled to assert this since my credence in it is sufficiently high), but I don’t believe that the pubs are open (since that credence does not quite reach 0.999).'

The preface paradox furnishes an example of a related phenomenon, this time producing concessive Moore sentences of type (1). You preface a long book that you have written with the modest words: ‘Despite all my efforts, I am sure that there is at least one mistake somewhere in the book’. But the book itself can be regarded as a very long assertion — the conjunction of many individual assertions. Indeed, suppose that we replace all periods but the final one throughout the book with ‘and’s. You should be as committed to this unwieldy sentence as you were to the original book (even if you have acquired some stylistic qualms about it). Conjoining the unwieldy sentence to your preface, we have an assertion of the form:

\[ \text{[MY BOOK] (the unwieldy sentence), and I believe that \text{‘MY BOOK’} is false (since I believe that at least some conjunct in it is false).} \]

Schematically, we have the dreaded

\[ p \text{ and } \neg p \]

The trouble is that assertion is an on/off, all-or-nothing act, whereas degrees of belief come in degrees. We do not have devices for giving assertion all of the nuance that we might want — say, boldness of typeface that varies with the strength of our convictions. Imagine that with each ‘and’ that we insert between successive sentences, their print fades accordingly; by the time we have conjoined them all, they become invisible!

In a way, all of us — and not just certain idiosyncratic philosophers — find ourselves in the same uncomfortable shoes as the modest preface-writer, for on pain of gross immodesty, we all admit that some of our beliefs are false. Each of us would thus assert something of the form:

\[ \text{[LONG CONJUNCTION OF MY BELIEFS] and I believe that \text{‘LONG CONJUNCTION OF MY BELIEFS’} is false.} \]

Note that this does not require you to provide a complete enumeration of all your beliefs—an impossible task, surely. It suffices that you can find some long conjunction of beliefs of yours that you believe is false—an easy task, surely. For example, a few dozen beliefs of yours about the capital cities of countries in the world, or about phone numbers, or about the names of the children of your friends and colleagues, may well do the job.

The conjunction might not even have to be at all long. Consider a recalcitrant paradox that has a grip on you that can be presented as a short list of premises,

\[ \text{each of which you believe, but which you recognize to be jointly contradictory. You assert:} \]

\[ \text{[SHORT CONJUNCTION OF THE PREMISES] and I believe that \text{‘SHORT CONJUNCTION OF THE PREMISES’} is false (since I recognize them to be jointly contradictory).} \]

Perhaps one of Kant’s antinomies will fit the bill. In fact, soon we will see a single premise giving rise to this phenomenon — although only for certain idiosyncratic philosophers.

‘There are no higher-order beliefs’

Suppose that you are not skeptical about beliefs, the way that Churchland and Stich are, but that you are skeptical about higher-order beliefs. So you are happy to speak of beliefs (‘I believe that it is raining’), and so on) but you have no truck with beliefs about one’s own beliefs (‘I believe that I believe that it is raining’, and so on). Now take a belief of yours — say, that it is raining. Then you should be prepared to assert:

‘I believe that it is raining, and I don’t believe that I believe that it is raining (for that would be a higher-order belief, with which I have no truck)’

— something of the form ‘\( p \) and I don’t believe that \( p’ \).

Now suppose that you are not totally skeptical about whether there are higher-order beliefs, but you think that it is at least an open question. Then it seems that you are committed to sentences such as:

‘I believe that it is raining, and it is an open question whether I believe that I believe that it is raining’

— something of the form ‘\( p \) and it is an open question whether I believe that \( p’ \).

‘There are only so many higher-orders that beliefs can reach’

Less radically, you might allow second-order, third-order, and perhaps still higher-order beliefs, but insist that the hierarchy must stop somewhere. You might say, for example, that the finiteness of our heads imposes limits on just how many times the belief operator can be iterated. (This is a commonplace in the literature on common knowledge in which it is acknowledged that the putative infinite iterations of ‘I know that you know that I know that . . . \( p \) are an idealization. See also Sorensen 2000.) Suppose, then, that you think that you have a highest order of belief: an \( n^{th} \) order belief, for some \( n > 2 \). Find, if you can, an \( (n+1)^{th} \) order belief of yours — say, that it is raining. Then you should be prepared to assert:

\[ \text{I thank Mitch Green for this point.} \]
‘There are no higher-order probabilities’: or ‘There are only so many higher-orders that probabilities can reach’

De Finetti (1972) and Savage (1954) are champions of subjective probabilities, but they are skeptical about higher-order subjective probabilities, or probabilities concerning one’s own probabilities. For example, by their lights it is nonsense to say ‘my probability that the coin lands heads is 1/2, and my probability that this really is my probability is 0.99’. De Finetti writes: ‘Any assertion concerning probabilities of events is merely the expression of somebody’s opinion and not itself an event. There is no meaning, therefore, in asking whether such an assertion is true or false or more or less probable.’ (1972:189). One of their arguments, roughly, is that any putative second-order probabilities would collapse to ordinary first-order probabilities—a reductio of the idea that there really were second-order probabilities in the first place. Both of these authors also seem to regard the threat of infinite regress as fatal to higher-order probabilities. Savage: ‘once second order probabilities are introduced, the introduction of an endless hierarchy seems inescapable. Such a hierarchy seems very difficult to interpret, and it seems at best to make the theory less realistic, not more’ (1954:58).

De Finetti: ‘we have events and probabilities of events only; otherwise we would have the beginning of an infinite regression (probability of a probability, and so on)’ (1972:193). Consider, then, some statement of probability that de Finetti or Savage is prepared to make—say, ‘The probability that the coin lands heads is 1/2’. Now conjoin to it their skepticism about the notion of this statement in turn having a probability, and thus a fortiori, skepticism about this statement having a high probability:

‘The probability that the coin lands heads is 1/2, and I don’t assign this claim high probability (for this claim is not the sort of thing that has a probability at all).’

That is, we have a sentence of the form (7).

Less radically, you might allow second-order, third-order, and perhaps still higher-order probabilities, but insist that the hierarchy must stop somewhere (again, perhaps because our heads are finite). Suppose, then, that you think that you have a highest-order probability assignment: an \(n^{th}\)-order assignment, for some \(n > 2\). Find, if you can, an \(n^{th}\)-order probability assignment of yours—say, that it is raining. Then you should be prepared to assert:

‘My \(n^{th}\)-order probability that it is raining is \(x\), but I don’t assign high probability to the claim that my \(n^{th}\)-order probability that it is raining is \(x\)’.

(for that would be an \((n+1)^{th}\) order probability assignment, which exceeds my limit).’

Again, we have a sentence of the form (7).

‘There is no such thing as truth’

Paralleling our discussion of Churchland and Stich, now consider a philosopher who is skeptical of the very notion of truth. Let us suppose that he is prepared to assert sentences as usual, but he balks at assertions of the truth of sentences. Thus, a true” Nietzschean ought to be prepared to assert sentences such as:

‘It is raining, but I believe that ‘it is raining’ is not true (for I reject the very notion of truth),’

a sentence of form (3). Similarly:

‘It is raining, but I don’t believe that ‘it is raining’ is true (for I reject the very notion of truth),’

a sentence of form (4). Certain French philosophers and certain literary critics have a similar disdain, disrespect, or disregard for truth. They will pay for it similarly in Moorean ways (which is not to say that this is the worst of their problems).

If someone were happy with the notion of (first-order) truth, but skeptical of the notion of higher-order truth, we could set them some Moorean bait:

‘It is raining’ is true, but I don’t believe that ‘ ‘It is raining’ is true’ is true (for that would involve higher-order truth, of which I am skeptical).’

And, much as before, we could also shanghai someone who thinks that there can be only \(n\) levels of higher-order truth, for some \(n > 2\), with an \(n^{th}\)-order truth-assertion of theirs that they do not believe is true.

A skeptic about subjective probability—perhaps along the lines of Harman (1986)—could presumably be prepared to assert:

‘It is raining, and I don’t assign ‘it is raining’ high probability (or indeed any probability, for I am skeptical about subjective probability),’

a sentence of form (7).

‘Truth is just what is useful for our purposes’ or ‘what is the consensus of our community’, or somehow ‘is relative’

We have just seen how to drive a wedge between an assertion and a belief in the truth of the assertion, by being unusually demanding about the notion of

7 I can’t resist this jab. Was Nietzsche a true Nietzschean in this respect? He seems to be when he writes: ‘Truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are’ (Nietzsche 1994: 47). I thank Harold Langsam for this reference.
truth. Going in the other direction, we could drive the wedge by being unusually 
undemanding about it. A certain kind of naive pragmatist, for example, might 
translate talk of truth into talk of what is useful for our purposes. Thus, perhaps:

‘God does not exist, but I believe that “God exists” is true (it being useful 
for our purposes generally to act as if God exists).’ 

I dare say that this position is too naive to take seriously. A bit more promising, 
perhaps, is the position of a rabid communitarian about truth; he thinks that the 
truth of a proposition p consists in a consensus of his community that p. He may 
find himself with a case of the Moores when he disagrees with such a consensus. 
For example:

‘God does not exist, but I believe that “God exists” is true (this being the 
consensus of my community).’

A certain kind of Peircian might append the words ‘... at the end of inquiry’, 
with similar results.

Anyone who holds a relativist account of truth should strictly speaking make 
no sense of locutions of the form ‘p is true’. For by a relativist’s lights, there is 
no one-place predicate ‘____ is true’ at all, but rather a two-place relation of the 
form ‘____ is true relative to ____’. The second argument-place will be filled in 
different ways by different relativists. A Protagorean may relativize an attribution 
of truth to a person; a Foucaultian may relativize it to a discursive formation; a 
Kuhnian may relativize it to a paradigm; a Quinean may relativize it to a theory 
or a language; a MacFarlanean may relativize it to a context of utterance or of 
assessment8. The upshot is that a relativist should hold that an attribution 
of truth simpliciter is ill-formed, and thus not something that can properly be 
believed. Much as strictly speaking it is nonsensical to believe or to assert ‘René 
is younger’ or ‘Los Angeles is west’, so it is nonsensical to believe or assert ‘p 
is true’, according to the relativist. And yet relativists seem to have no trouble 
believing or asserting things in the normal way (some of them, anyway). Thus, 
Moorean sentences should glide off their tongues:

‘It is raining, and I don’t believe that “it is raining” is true (being nonsensical, 
as it lacks a needed second relatum).’

To be sure, context often makes missing relata clear. In a conversation in which I 
am comparing my age to various people, you will have no trouble understanding 
me when I say ‘René is younger’, because it is obviously elliptical for ‘René is 
younger than me’. Likewise, if we are both standing in New York, I may 
permissibly say ‘Los Angeles is west’, leaving tacit the relativization to here, 
understood by both of us to be New York. That does not show that ‘younger’ 
or ‘west’ may suddenly become one-place predicates. Rather, context simply 

8 See MacFarlane (2005).
There are probabilistic analogues of this phenomenon. Suppose that your state of opinion cannot be represented by a single probability function—e.g., your probability for rain is vague over the interval [0.5, 0.75]. Following Levi (1974), Jeffrey (1983), and van Fraassen (1990), we may represent you with a set of probability functions, each of which precisifies your probability for rain with some sharp number in the interval. What is determinately true of your opinion is agreed upon by all the functions in this set. It is determinately true in the example that your probability for rain is at least 1/2. On the other hand, any statement about your opinion that is true according to some functions in the set and false according to others is indeterminate, and thus not determinately true—e.g., that your probability for rain is at least 0.6.

Now suppose that there is a proposition $p$ for which your probability assignment is vague over a wide interval—wide enough that according to the left-hand endpoint, $p$ is not probable, while on the basis of the right-hand endpoint, it is assertable. For example, suppose that your probability of being life on Mars is vague over the interval [0.4, 1]. According to some permissible precisifications of your opinion (e.g., 0.4), you do not assign high probability to ‘there is life on Mars;’ thus you do not determinately assign high probability to ‘there is life on Mars’. According to others (e.g., 1), ‘there is life on Mars’ is assertible; thus, it is permissible for you to assert ‘there is life on Mars’. Conjoining these facts, we now get you to assert:

‘There is life on Mars (I permissibly assert), and I don’t (determinately) assign ‘there is life on Mars’ high probability.’

We arrive at a sentence of form (7) once we drop the parenthetical reminders of how we got there.

I said at the outset that there is apparently no way of interpreting someone who utters (7) as having a single probability assignment for $p$. I am offering a way of interpreting such a person if we may ascribe to them vague opinion, represented as multiple probability assignments for $p$.

So far I have tried to impale various specific philosophical positions on Moorish sentences, suggesting that even if the philosophers who propound these positions don’t feel any discomfort there, the rest of us may well do so. But let us not get too smug. Perhaps I should not single out these philosophers. Perhaps they are in good company.
reason to think that much that is asserted in philosophy is simply false. Moreover, we philosophers know this. We need merely remind ourselves how much philosophers disagree; at most one party to a disagreement can be right (assuming that the disagreement is genuine and the parties are not merely talking past each other, and ignoring dialethiaism). Even prior to such disagreement, we must acknowledge that philosophy is a subtle business, and that saying something philosophically interesting and true is no mean feat; yet what is philosophically uninteresting is less likely to make it to print (still less high-profile print), so we have incentives to stick our necks out. And whatever the explanation, there is surely the brute historical fact that many, and perhaps even most, substantive philosophical positions that have been offered are false. (Indeed, some of the positions, believe it or not, even have Moore-paradoxical commitments!) For every important philosophical position that you claim is true, I will respond with ten such positions that we agree are false. But I’m sure you don’t need me—you can do it yourself.

Laudan (1981) offers a pessimistic meta-induction concerning the truth of scientific theories, on the basis of the historical track record of science. A philosopher like you may well likewise run a pessimistic meta-induction concerning the truth of philosophical theories, on the basis of the historical track record of philosophy. And now here you are, advancing your own ambitious, bold philosophical position: p. You assert it vigorously, you defend it in high-profile print, and so on. But do you really believe it? Suppose that you must bet at high stakes on p’s truth, and that God will settle the matter. Still feeling confident in it? You may not think, after all, that you are that much more reliable than various philosophers who have come before you whose equally vigorous assertions have not withstood the test of time. And so your standards for assertion and for belief are sundered. You publicly assert p, maybe even in high-profile print, but if you are honest with yourself, you admit that you believe that p is probably false, or that you are at best agnostic about p; in any case you don’t believe that p. At such a reflective and reflexive moment, then, you may catch yourself asserting sotto voce: ‘My philosophical position says “p” and I don’t believe “p”’. Not that you will ever say that in print.

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