In Defence of Interactionism

Abstract

Mind–body dualism is intuitively a plausible position, the important contemporary varieties of which are epiphenomenalism and interactionism. The former acknowledges causal relations only from the body to the mind; the latter insists that the causal relations go both ways. This thesis defends interactionist dualism against a set of commonly raised objections.

Given dualism about phenomenal experience I argue that interactionism has a decisive advantage over epiphenomenalism, first because epiphenomenalism clashes thoroughly with widespread and entrenched intuitions about motivation, secondly because epiphenomenalism leads to the incredible conclusion that whether or not judgements about phenomenal experienc are justified fails to depend on the experiences they are about.

The advantage I argue that interactionism holds relies on the causal efficacy of phenomenal experience. I consider and reject a conceptual argument which charges interactionism with being unable to deliver this advantage.

Interactionism is often thought to be unsustainable on the grounds of conflict with results from science. One of these is the law of conservation of energy. I argue, however, that there are well supported and useful formulations of that law that do not exclude interactionism.

The thesis that the physical world is causally closed is a result with which interactionism is indeed incompatible. I argue that we lack credible evidence for the thesis, and that the arguments that are supposed to show that the thesis is true rely on a premise the dualist has no reason to accept

I conclude that interactionism is an attractive and viable position in contemporary philosophy of mind.