KNOWING HOW WITHOUT KNOWING THAT

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What is knowledge-how? One prominent view, often known as intellectualism, is that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. More precisely, the view is that knowing how to do something is a matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to some relevant proposition, and perhaps also satisfying some further condition. My aim here is to argue that intellectualism is subject to three different kinds of counterexample. Each counterexample is a scenario where someone knows how to φ but they fail to stand in the knowledge-that relation to any proposition p, such that their knowing how to φ might plausibly be identified (either partly or wholly) with their knowing that p. The counterexamples differ with respect to the reason for this failure.

In denying that knowledge-how is a matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to a proposition, I thereby endorse Gilbert Ryle’s\(^1\) conclusion that intellectualism is false, albeit for different reasons. However, I do not thereby endorse either Ryle’s account of knowledge-how or the most well known alternative to intellectualism, namely, the view that to know how to φ is to simply possess the corresponding ability to φ—a view closely associated with

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\(^1\) “Knowing How and Knowing That,” in his *Collected Papers Volume 2* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971) pp. 212-25 [hereafter Ryle I], and *The Concept of Mind*, (Chicago: University Press, 1949) [hereafter Ryle II] chapter 2. Ryle often seems to conflate a view about knowledge-how with a distinct view about intelligent actions both of which he calls ‘intellectualism’ or ‘the intellectualist legend’. The latter view is of no concern to us here.
Ryle that is sometimes known as *neo-Ryleanism*. After presenting (§1) and defending my case against intellectualism (§§2–3), I suggest that the previous discussion points to a new view of knowledge-how distinct from both intellectualism and Ryleanism (§4), although it shares important features with each of these views.

1. THREE COUNTEREXAMPLES

To see why the examples I will present are counterexamples it will help to have some actual intellectualist account of knowledge-how in mind. In what follows I focus on Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s influential analysis of knowledge-how as “simply a species of propositional knowledge” (*ibid.*, p. 441):

S knows how to φ if, and only if, there is some contextually relevant way *w* for S to φ such that:

(a) S stands in the knowledge-that relation to the proposition that *w* is a way for S to φ, and

(b) S entertains *w* under a practical mode of presentation.

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2 See §4 for discussion of the relationship between neo-Ryleanism and Ryle’s own account of knowledge-how.


4 S&W’s official statement of their view differs from the analysis given above in that it is stated as an analysis of the truth conditions of ‘S knows how to φ’ ascriptions, see S&W (*ibid.*, p. 430). But S&W also explicitly endorse the analysis of knowledge-how stated above. The reason for focusing on the analysis above is simply that intellectualism is a view about the nature of knowledge-how itself, and not merely a view about the meaning of knowledge-how ascriptions.
According to Stanley and Williamson (henceforth S&W) then, Shane knows how to bowl a googly just in case Shane stands in the knowledge-that relation to some contextually relevant proposition of the form ‘w is a way for Shane to bowl a googly’ and Shane entertains this proposition under a practical mode of presentation.

With S&W’s account in mind I can introduce our three putative counterexamples. I take each example to be a case where knowledge-how comes apart from knowledge-that; that is, a case where someone knows how to ϕ but there is no proposition p such that their knowing how to ϕ might be plausibly identified (either partly or wholly) with their knowing that p. The first example is a case where intuitively someone knows how to ϕ but they do not possess the kind of knowledge-that that such knowledge-how might be plausibly identified with, because their relevant beliefs are only accidentally true. Similar cases have been discussed in the literature. But the possibility that such cases constitute counterexamples to intellectualism has normally been overlooked⁵ (a point I will return to at the end of this section).

The second and third cases are each of a kind that has not been discussed before. The second case is a scenario where intuitively someone knows how to ϕ but they do not possess the kind of knowledge-that that this knowledge-how

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⁵ Aidan McGlynn, on his blog The Boundaries of Language, has independently noted the possibility of construing Gettier style cases like our first example as counterexamples to intellectualism (see, http://aidanmcglynn.blogspot.com/2007/08/is-knowledge-how-gettier-susceptible.html).
might be plausibly identified with, because their relevant beliefs are defeated. The third case is a scenario where intuitively someone knows how to φ but they do not possess the kind of knowledge-that that this knowledge-how might be plausibly identified with, because they lack the relevant beliefs. Here then are our three putative counterexamples:

_The Lucky Light Bulb_

Charlie wants to learn how to change a light bulb, but he knows almost nothing about light fixtures or bulbs. So he consults _The Idiot’s Guide to Everyday Jobs_. Inside, Charlie finds an accurate set of instructions describing a light fixture and bulb, and the way to change a bulb. Charlie grasps these instructions perfectly. And there is a way, call it ‘\(w_1\)’, such that Charlie now believes that \(w_1\) is a way for him to change a light bulb, namely, the way described in the book. However, unbeknownst to Charlie, he is extremely lucky to have read these instructions. For the disgruntled author of _The Idiot’s Guide_ filled her book with misleading instructions. Under every entry she misdescribed the objects involved in that job, and described a series of actions that would not constitute a way to do the job at all. However, at the printers, a computer error caused the text under the entry for ‘Changing a Light Bulb’, in just one copy of the book, to be randomly

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6 The three arguments by counterexample given here closely parallel, and are inspired by, arguments that Dean Pettit has given for the conclusion that linguistic understanding is not a kind of knowledge-that, see his “Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language” in _Mind_, Vol. 111 (2002): 519–50. I will not examine Pettit’s arguments here as to do so would take us into issues beyond the scope of the present discussion. Nevertheless, my intellectual debt to Pettit’s arguments should be clear to those familiar with his excellent paper.
replaced by new text. By incredible coincidence, this new text provided the clear and accurate set of instructions that Charlie would later consult.

The Dogmatic Hallucinator

Lucy occasionally suffers from a peculiar kind of hallucination. On occasion it seems to her that she remembers an event of learning how to $\phi$, when no such event occurred. Furthermore, the way Lucy ‘remembers’ as being the way to $\phi$, is not a way to $\phi$ at all. On Saturday, a clown teaches Lucy how to juggle. Consequently, she knows how to juggle. And there is a way, call it ‘$w_2$’, such that Lucy now believes that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle, namely, the way the clown taught her to juggle. On Sunday, Lucy is about to tell a friend the good news that she knows how to juggle. However, as she begins, the alarm goes off on her false memory detector, or FMD, a remarkable device that is a super-reliable detector of her false memories. This indicates to Lucy that her apparent memory of learning how to juggle is a false memory that is misleading with respect to the way to juggle. Normally, Lucy would revise her beliefs accordingly, and this is what she believes she ought to do now. However, on this occasion she is unable to shake the beliefs she believes she ought to revise. For example, Lucy continues to believe that she knows how to juggle and that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle. Of course, Lucy did learn how to juggle yesterday, so her FMD has made an error, albeit one that was highly unlikely.
The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator

Jodie occasionally suffers from a peculiar kind of hallucination. On occasion it seems to her that she remembers an event of learning how to $\phi$, when no such event occurred. Furthermore, the way Jodie ‘remembers’ as being the way to $\phi$, is not a way to $\phi$ at all. On Saturday, a clown teaches Jodie how to juggle. Consequently, she knows how to juggle. And there is a way, call it ‘$w_3$’, such that Jodie now believes that $w_3$ is a way for her to juggle, namely, the way the clown taught her to juggle. On Sunday, Jodie is about to tell a friend the good news that she knows how to juggle. However, as she begins, the alarm goes off on her false memory detector, or FMD, a remarkable device that is a super-reliable detector of her false memories. This indicates to Jodie that her apparent memory of learning how to juggle is a false memory that is misleading with respect to the way to juggle. Normally, Jodie would revise her beliefs accordingly, and this is what Jodie does. For example, she no longer believes that she knows how to juggle or that $w_3$ is a way for her to juggle. Of course, Jodie did learn how to juggle yesterday, so her FMD has made an error, albeit one that was highly unlikely.

The conclusion that these examples are all counterexamples to S&W’s account of knowledge-how rests on two premises. The first premise is that the subjects in these cases each possess the relevant knowledge-how. More precisely, the premise states that the following claims are all correct, where ‘$t_1$’ refers to a moment just after Charlie has grasped the instructions in *The Idiots Guide*, ‘$t_2$’ refers to a moment just after Lucy has resisted revising her beliefs, and ‘$t_3$’ refers to a moment just after Jodie has revised her beliefs:
The Knowledge-how (KH) Claims

(KH.1) At $t_1$ Charlie knows how to change a light bulb

(KH2) At $t_2$ Lucy knows how to juggle

(KH3) At $t_3$ Jodie knows how to juggle

The second premise is that the subjects do not possess the kind of knowledge-that S&W would identify their knowledge-how with. More precisely, the premise states that the following claims are all correct:

The No Knowledge-that (NKT) Claims

(NKT1) At $t_1$ Charlie does not know that $w_1$ is a way for him to change a light bulb

(NKT2) At $t_2$ Lucy does not know that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle

(NKT3) At $t_3$ Jodie does not know that $w_3$ is a way for her to juggle

The KH claims, I submit, are all intuitively correct. The fact that Charlie is extremely lucky to read accurate (as opposed to misleading) instructions just seems irrelevant to whether or not he comes to know how to change a light bulb on the basis of reading those instructions. The fact that a number of Lucy’s beliefs about juggling are defeated does not seem to be a reason to think that she has lost her knowledge how to juggle. Indeed, the intuitive thing to say with regard to Lucy’s belief at $t_2$ that she knows how to juggle, is that while this belief is unjustified, it is nonetheless true. Finally, the fact that at $t_3$ Jodie no longer believes that she knows how to juggle, or that $w_3$ is a way for her to
juggle, does not seem to be a reason to conclude that Jodie has lost her knowledge how to juggle. Indeed, while Jodie’s belief at $t_3$ that she does not know how to juggle is justified, it is also intuitively false.

Moving to the NKT claims, recall that according to S&W if S knows how to $\phi$ then there is some contextually relevant way $w$ such that S knows that $w$ is a way for S to $\phi$. But this putative necessary condition for knowing how to $\phi$ fails to hold in any of our three scenarios. The contextually relevant ways in our three scenarios are clearly just $w_1$, $w_2$ and $w_3$. Now, at $t_1$ Charlie does believe that $w_1$ is a way for him to change a light bulb, and this belief is both true and justified. But this belief does not constitute knowledge for it is only accidentally true, or true only as a matter of mere luck. And it is a familiar lesson from the Gettier literature, that knowledge-that is incompatible with the kind of epistemic luck present in this scenario.7

Similarly, at $t_2$ Lucy does believe that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle. But, again, this belief does not constitute knowledge. For Lucy knows that her FMD is a super-reliable detector of her false memories, and that these false memories are misleading with respect to the way to perform the relevant action. Lucy believes then that her belief that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle is not reliable or epistemically responsible. Furthermore, she is justified in this higher-order belief. In such a situation, Lucy’s first-order belief that $w_2$ is a way for her to

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7 We need not offer an analysis here of the kind of epistemic luck that knowledge-that excludes. Notoriously, no such analysis is widely accepted. But there is widespread agreement that knowledge-that excludes that kind of luck—whatever it is exactly—that is at work in Gettier cases. All we require then, is that the case I described is of a kind with cases found in the Gettier literature. And I think that it clearly is. For an excellent discussion of these issues see Duncan Pritchard’s *Epistemic Luck* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
juggle, while true, does not possess the justification or warrant necessary for knowledge. Finally, at $t_3$ Jodie clearly does not know that $w_3$ is a way for her to juggle. For Jodie does not even believe that $w_3$ is a way for her to juggle.

I submit that the KH and NKT claims are all correct. It follows that each of our three examples is a counterexample to S&W’s account of knowledge-how.

Furthermore, I submit that these examples will be counterexamples to any plausible account of knowledge-how whereby knowing how to $\phi$ is a matter of standing in the knowledge-that relation to some relevant proposition $p$, and perhaps also satisfying some further condition (such as entertaining the proposition under a practical mode of presentation). On any plausible version of such an account, this proposition $p$ will concern something like a way, method or procedure for $\phi$-ing. If so, it will be an easy exercise to redescribe our three examples to emphasize the fact that Charlie’s belief that $p$ is only accidentally true, that Lucy’s belief that $p$ is defeated, and that Jodie does not believe that $p$. In other words, for any plausible account of knowledge-how whereby one knows how to $\phi$ only if one stands in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition $p$, we will be able to provide parallel arguments for the corresponding NKT claims of the form: ‘At $t_n$ S does not know that $p$.’ The arguments given here clearly apply then to other important intellectualist

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8 I assume that the defeater for Lucy’s belief that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle is her higher-order belief that her belief that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle is not reliable. But this assumption is not essential to my argument. It could be that the defeater is Lucy’s experience of seeing the readout on her FMD or some relevant proposition. For our purposes, all that matters is that Lucy’s belief that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle does not constitute knowledge-that in this scenario. Similarly, for ease of exposition, I assume that what gets defeated is Lucy’s belief that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle. But my argument is perfectly consistent with views according to which it is Lucy’s reasons for believing that $w_2$ is a way for her to juggle that are defeated, rather than the belief itself.
accounts of knowledge-how, including those offered by John Bengson and Marc Moffett,\textsuperscript{9} and Berit Brogaard.\textsuperscript{10}

To clarify our three arguments by counterexample, it may help to contrast one of them with a related but weaker form of argument against intellectualism examined by S&W and Ted Poston, each of whom discusses cases like the lucky light bulb as a means of evaluating this objection.\textsuperscript{11} S&W imagine that someone might object to their account of knowledge-how by appealing to a supposed disanalogy between knowledge-how and knowledge-that:

On the analysis we presented in the last section, knowing-how is analyzed in terms of knowing-that. In particular, knowing how to $F$ is a matter of knowing that $p$, for a certain proposition $p$ (as well as entertaining it under the right mode of presentation). So, knowing-how is straightforwardly analysed in terms of knowing-that. But one might worry that significant disanalogies still remain between knowing-how and other kinds of knowing-that. One potential source of disanalogy involves Gettier cases. We can imagine cases of justified true belief that fail to be knowledge-that, because they fail to satisfy some extra condition. It may appear difficult to conceive of Gettier-cases for knowledge–how. But if knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that, there should be such cases. (S&W op. cit., p. 435)

\textsuperscript{9} “Know How and Concept Possession,” \textit{Philosophical Studies} 136 (2007): 31–57 [hereafter Bengson and Moffett I], and “The Folk On Knowing How,” forthcoming in \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} [hereafter Bengson and Moffett II]. Bengson and Moffett are committed to the claim that S knows how to $\phi$ only if, for some way $w$, S knows that $w$ is a way to $\phi$.

\textsuperscript{10} “What Mary Did Yesterday,” forthcoming in \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} [hereafter Brogaard I], and “Knowledge-The and Propositional Attitude Ascriptions,” forthcoming in \textit{Knowledge and Questions}, ed. Franck Lihoreau [hereafter Brogaard II]. Brogaard is committed to the claim that S knows how to $\phi$ only if, for some way $w$, S knows that $w$ is how to $\phi$.

\textsuperscript{11} “Know how to be Gettiered?” forthcoming in \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}. 
S&W dismiss this disanalogy objection by disputing the claim that there are no Gettier cases for knowledge-how.\footnote{As we will see in §2, S&W also another reason for rejecting this disanalogy objection, namely, they reject the assumption that all kinds of knowledge-that are susceptible to Gettier cases.} In response, Poston defends the disanalogy objection by defending the claim that there are no Gettier cases for knowledge-how.

The disanalogy objection and my argument that appeals to the lucky light bulb case are importantly different. Suppose we could demonstrate that Poston is right, and there are no Gettier cases for knowledge-how. That is, no cases where one fails to know how to φ for the same kind of reason one fails to know that p in a standard Gettier case. This alone would not establish that intellectualism is false. As it could be the case that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that that is merely disanalogous, in this respect, to other kinds of knowledge-that. That is, for all that we have shown, it could be the case that in any Gettier-like scenario where someone knows how to φ, they will also possess the kind of knowledge-that that intellectualists would identify their knowledge-how with.

On the other hand, our argument claims that there is at least one Gettier scenario where someone knows how to φ and they also fail to possess the kind of knowledge-that that this knowledge-how might be plausibly identified with. If this is correct, it does follow that knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that. Furthermore, the existence of such a Gettier scenario is consistent with the existence of other Gettier scenarios where knowledge-how and knowledge-that go together. Our argument does not require then that
knowledge-how is never susceptible to the kind of epistemic luck found in Gettier cases. Nor, for that matter, does it require that knowledge-that is always susceptible to such luck.

The crucial issue then, with respect to Gettier scenarios, is not whether or not there is some disanalogy between knowledge-how and knowledge-that with respect to such scenarios. Rather, the crucial issue is whether or not knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart in any such scenarios.

The more general moral is that to respond to any of our putative counterexamples, it will not suffice for the intellectualist to merely argue that there are other similar cases where knowledge-how and knowledge-that go together. Rather, the intellectualist must dispute the evaluation offered of these particular examples. There are obviously two ways they could do this. For each case the intellectualist could deny the relevant KH claim, or they could deny the relevant NKT claim. I will discuss both forms of response separately. In doing so, I hope to show that on close examination neither form of response is plausible.

2. THE NO KNOWLEDGE-THAT CLAIMS

The first form of response to our putative counterexamples I will consider is the response that disputes the relevant NKT claim. If we start with the lucky light bulb case, the question is whether the intellectualist can reasonably deny NKT1. Recall that the reason for thinking that Charlie’s belief that w₁ is a way for him to change a light bulb does not constitute knowledge-that is that this belief is
only accidentally true.\textsuperscript{13} If the intellectualist is to claim that at $t_i$ Charlie does know that $w_i$ is a way for him to change a light bulb, they will have to deny the standard view that knowledge-that is subject to an anti-luck condition. Namely, that if one knows that $p$ then it is not a matter of mere luck or accident that one’s belief that $p$ is true. Denying NKT1 appears to be an unattractive response to the lucky light bulb case because it commits the intellectualist to a major revision of our conception of knowledge-that.

The intellectualist might still respond that all that is needed is a ‘localized’ rejection of the idea that knowledge-that is subject to an anti-luck condition. S&W themselves could be interpreted as suggesting this kind of response in their discussion of the disanalogy objection:

\begin{quote}
We doubt that every kind of knowledge-that is susceptible to Gettier cases. So it would not worry us if it were not possible to come up with a Gettier case for knowledge-how (S&W \textit{ibid.}, p. 435).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} One might point out that at $t_i$ Charlie is better positioned with respect to knowing that $w_i$ is a way for him to change a light bulb than he was before $t_i$. For example, if he now attempts to change a light bulb he will come to know that $w_i$ is a way for him to change a light bulb more easily than he would have if he didn’t already believe that this was the case. This is true but beside the point. For it does not alter the fact that at $t_i$ Charlie does not know that $w_i$ is a way for him to change a light bulb. Consider an analogy. At morning tea you ask Mary if she knows which bus goes to Kingston. She tells you that the 501 goes to Kingston and you believe her, despite the fact that you know that Mary is a compulsive liar. And indeed, Mary did intend to give you false information but, by accident, she gave you correct information. Given your new true belief that the 501 goes to Kingston, you are now in a better position with respect to knowing that the 501 goes to Kingston. For now you are more likely to act in ways that will lead to you gaining further evidence in support of this belief. For example, if you want to get a bus to Kingston you will choose to catch the 501. But your new proximity to knowledge does not change the fact that at morning tea—when your only evidence is testimony from a source you know to be highly unreliable—your belief does not constitute knowledge.
On one interpretation of this passage, S&W are claiming that they would be unconcerned if they had to deny that knowledge-how is subject to an anti-luck condition because they think that there are other kinds of knowledge-that are also not subject to such a condition. And the claim that knowledge-how is not subject to an anti-luck condition is consistent with the claim that other kinds of knowledge-that are subject to such a condition. S&W might then point out that in claiming that Charlie knows that \( w_1 \) is a way for him to change a light bulb they need only commit themselves to the claim that one particular kind of knowledge-that is not subject to an anti-luck condition.

However, S&W cannot simply assert that knowledge-how is a distinctive kind of knowledge-that that is not susceptible to Gettier cases. Rather, what they would need to establish is that S’s standing in the knowledge-that relation to a proposition of the form ‘\( w \) is a way for S to \( \phi \)’, is a distinctive kind of knowledge-that that is not susceptible to Gettier cases. But why should we think that this is the case? There is nothing obviously special about propositions concerning ways to perform actions such that S could know that \( p \), even though

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The claim that not all kinds of knowledge-that are susceptible to Gettier cases is somewhat difficult to interpret, as there are at least two quite distinct ways it could turn out to be true. As interpreted above, the idea is that there is at least one kind of knowledge-that such that one can possess this kind of knowledge-that even when one’s relevant justified true beliefs are only accidentally true. If this were the case, then this kind of knowledge-that would not be susceptible to Gettier cases because it is not subject to an anti-luck condition. But perhaps S&W’s idea here is that there are some kinds of knowledge-that such that one simply cannot describe any scenario where one has the relevant justified true beliefs but they are only accidentally true. If this were the case then this kind of knowledge-that would not be susceptible to Gettier cases, but it would still be subject to an anti-luck condition, for it would trivially satisfy such a condition. I have focused on the former idea above for the simple reason that we obviously can describe scenarios where someone has a justified true belief of the form ‘\( w \) is a way to \( \phi \)’ that is only accidentally true.
S’s belief that \( p \) is merely accidentally true, whenever \( p \) happens to be a proposition of the form ‘\( w \) is a way for \( S \) to \( \phi \)’.

Perhaps S&W might argue that the relevant kind of knowledge-that that is not susceptible to Gettier cases is the knowledge-that \( S \) has when \( S \) stands in the knowledge-that relation to some proposition of the form ‘\( w \) is a way for \( S \) to \( \phi \)’ and \( S \) entertains that proposition under a practical mode of presentation. That is, S&W could claim that the fact that Charlie’s belief that \( w_1 \) is a way for him to change a light bulb is accidentally true is irrelevant to whether or not he knows that \( w_1 \) is a way for him to change a light bulb under a practical mode of presentation.

But note how odd this suggestion would be. No one has ever tried to defend the tripartite analysis of knowledge by claiming that while the subjects in Gettier cases do not come to know that \( p \) under such-and-such mode of presentation they do come to know that \( p \) under some other mode of presentation. And there is a good reason why not. For the fact that someone’s belief that \( p \) is merely accidentally true is surely a reason to think that they do not know that \( p \) simpliciter, regardless of what mode of presentation they happen to entertain that proposition under.

At the very least, if S&W were to adopt this response they would owe us an explanation of why knowledge of propositions of the form ‘\( w \) is a way for one to \( \phi \)’ is resistant to Gettier influences in the special case where one entertains that proposition under a practical mode of presentation. And this explanation cannot simply consist in the claim that knowing that \( w \) is a way for one to \( \phi \) under a practical mode of presentation is knowledge-how and knowledge-how is resistant to Gettier influences.
The problem is that modes of presentation look like the wrong kind of thing on which to base such an explanation. Consider the sorts of reasons that are typically offered to explain why S fails to know that p in a given Gettier scenario: that the truth of S’s belief that p is not appropriately related to S’s reasons for holding that belief, or that the source of S’s belief that p is unreliable, and so on. Such reasons for thinking that S fails to know that p do not seem even to be addressed, let alone outweighed or undermined, by the extra information that S happens to entertain p under such-and-such a mode of presentation.

The general point is that it is difficult to see how the intellectualist could motivate the claim that in denying NKT1 they need only endorse a localized, rather than wholesale, rejection of the idea that knowledge-that is subject to an anti-luck condition. For the kind of knowledge-that that intellectualists’ identify knowledge-how with has no distinctive features that would support such a claim. Denying NKT1 is still an unattractive response then to the lucky light bulb case, given that it commits the intellectualist to such a major revision of the standard conception of knowledge-that.

And if anything the situation with regard to NKT2 and NKT3 is worse. For recall the reasons given in §1 for accepting these two claims. NKT2 was supported by the claim that at t2 Lucy’s belief that w2 is a way for her to juggle is defeated, and hence does not possess the justification or warrant necessary for it to constitute knowledge. NKT3 was supported by the claim that at t3 Jodie does not believe that w3 is a way for her to juggle. If we accept the defeat and no-belief claims, the consequences of denying NKT2 and NKT3 are severe. If the defeat claim is true, to deny NKT2 is to deny that having justification or
warrant for one’s belief that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. And if the belief claim is true, to deny NKT3 is to deny that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p.

Faced with a choice between maintaining that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and denying that knowledge-that is subject to a justified or warranted belief condition, I take it that the right choice is clear. We should reject the intellectualist thesis. Faced with the parallel choice with regard to the belief condition, the right choice is just as clear. Again, we should reject the intellectualist thesis. To choose otherwise in either case would be to radically revise our conception of knowledge-that, just to maintain the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that.

If the intellectualist is to deny NKT2 and NKT3 then, they must establish that the defeat and belief claims are false. But can one plausibly deny either of these claims? Perhaps, against the defeat claim, the intellectualist might argue that when one entertains a proposition p under a practical mode of presentation, then one’s belief that p can be justified even when one has a justified belief that their belief that p is unreliable. But, again, I think the intellectualist would be hard pressed to justify this ‘localized’ rejection of what clearly looks like a necessary condition for knowledge-that in general. Namely, that if one knows that p then one does not have a justified belief that one’s belief that p is unreliable, or epistemically inappropriate. The fact that Lucy has a justified

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15 This kind of condition is widely accepted as a necessary condition for knowledge-that by both internalists and externalists, for discussion see Michael Bergman’s “Internalism, Externalism and The No-Defeater Condition,” *Synthese*, 110 (1997): 399–417. There is some debate about whether one’s second-order belief that one’s belief that p is not reliable must itself be justified in order for it to defeat one’s first-order belief that p. But this debate is not relevant here given that Lucy’s higher-order belief is justified.
belief that her belief that \( w_2 \) is a way for her to juggle is unreliable, is surely a reason to conclude that she does not know that \( w_2 \) is a way for her to juggle *simpliciter*. It is not merely a reason to conclude that Lucy does not know that \( w_2 \) is a way for her to juggle, if she happens to entertain this proposition under a non-practical mode of presentation.

What of the no-belief claim? Couldn’t one argue that at \( t_3 \) Jodie still *implicitly* or *tacitly* believes that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle? And, if so, couldn’t one argue that Jodie still implicitly or tacitly knows that that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle? Undoubtedly, there is a good sense in which at \( t_3 \) it will still *seem* to Jodie that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle. For example, if Jodie imagines \( w_3 \), this way will still strike her as being a way to juggle. But we should not confuse mere seemings with beliefs. Even if one knows that the two lines in a Müller-Lyer figure are of the same length, it will still seem to one that they differ in length. And as George Bealer\(^{16}\) has pointed out (amongst others), the same point applies not only to perceptual but also to intellectual seemings. To use one of Bealer’s examples, it can still seem to one that the naïve axiom of set theory is true even though one does not believe that it is true, because one knows that it leads to a contradiction. Likewise, while it seems to Jodie that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle I think it is clear that she fails to believe that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle.

Furthermore, Jodie has consciously reflected on the question of whether or not \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle, and she has concluded on the basis of her

relevant evidence that \( w_3 \) is not a way for her to juggle. If someone has consciously reflected on the question of whether or not \( p \) and concluded on the basis of their relevant evidence that \( \neg p \), this is normally a strong indicator that they do not believe that \( p \). There are difficult cases (including cases involving delusional beliefs) where one might think that someone has both the belief that \( p \) and the belief that \( \neg p \) at the same time. But I see no reason to regard the non-dogmatic hallucinator as being such a case. More importantly, even if there can be cases where one still believes that \( p \) after coming to believe that \( \neg p \) on the basis of the kind of conscious reflection Jodie engages in, these would clearly be cases where one fails to know that \( p \).

Denying the relevant NKT claim does not look to be a plausible response for the intellectualist to any of our putative counterexamples. In each case, denying the NKT claim forces the intellectualist to reject a plausible and widely accepted assumption about the nature of knowledge-that. However, there is still another form of response to our counterexamples that we need to evaluate.

3. THE KNOWLEDGE-HOW CLAIMS

The second possible form of response to our putative counterexamples is to contest the relevant KH claim. There is reason to think that S&W would at least reject KH1. Consider what S&W say about the following example they offer as proof that there can be Gettier cases for knowledge-how:

Bob wants to learn how to fly in a flight simulator. He is instructed by Henry. Unknown to Bob, Henry is a malicious imposter who has inserted a randomising device in the simulator’s controls and intends to give all kinds of incorrect advice. Fortunately, by sheer chance the randomising device causes exactly the same results in the simulator as would
have occurred without it, and by incompetence Henry gives exactly the same advice as a proper instructor would have done. Bob passes the course with flying colors. He has still not flown a real plane. Bob has a justified true belief about how to fly. But there is a good sense in which he does not know how to fly. (op. cit., p. 435)

So, S&W think that this example—I will call it the flight simulator case—is a case where someone fails to know how to $\phi$ for the same kind of reason one fails to know that $p$ in a Gettier scenario. Now, for the reasons discussed at the end of §1, if S&W’s evaluation of this case is correct it does not follow that KH.1 is false. Nevertheless, given the obvious similarities between the flight simulator and lucky light bulb cases one might reasonably expect that our verdicts about whether Bob knows how to fly and whether Charlie knows how to change a light bulb should be the same. If S&W are right then in claiming that Bob does not know how to fly, this would at least give us some reason to reconsider KH1.

But are S&W right? Is there a good sense in which Bob does not know how to fly? Clearly, Bob has justified and true beliefs about flying that do not constitute knowledge-that, because they are only accidentally true. However, I think S&W are simply wrong that the intuitive thing to say of this case is that Bob does not know how to fly. As Poston (op. cit.) says, “As far as intuition goes this does not seem correct. There is a good sense in which Bob does know how to fly.”

To make the intuition vivid, compare Bob with his near perfect counterpart Joe. The only salient difference between Bob and Joe is that in Joe’s world his simulator not only operates correctly but it has not been interfered with, and his instructor not only gives him the correct advice but he intended to do so. So,
when Joe exits his simulator, we can safely assume that he knows how to fly. But on what grounds then, could we deny that Bob knows how to fly? The fact that Bob, unlike Joe, is extremely lucky to receive the very same feedback from his simulator/instructor does not seem to be a reason to conclude that only Joe comes to know how to fly on the basis of receiving this feedback.\textsuperscript{17}

Someone might try to argue for the claim that there is both a good sense in which Bob knows how to fly and a good sense in which he does not know how to fly. I doubt that this is the case but two points are worth mentioning about this claim. First, it is clear that S&W themselves do not take knowledge-how ascriptions to be ambiguous in this way. Second, as S&W acknowledge, Bob’s relevant belief of the form ‘$w$ is a way for Bob to fly’ does not constitute knowledge-that in this scenario. If so, then if there is a good sense in which Bob knows how to fly it follows that there is a good sense in which knowledge-how comes apart from knowledge-that in the flight simulator case. In other words, it

\textsuperscript{17} Note that we could have used a similar comparison to support the intuition for KH1. Compare Charlie with his near perfect counterpart Jack. Jack’s world is just like Charlie’s in all but one salient respect. Namely, in Jack’s world \textit{The Idiots Guide} was written by a non-malicious author who intended to fill her book with helpful descriptions of ways to perform everyday jobs (and there were no errors during printing etc.). The text in Jack’s copy of \textit{The Idiot’s Guide} is the same as the text in Charlie’s copy of \textit{The Idiot’s Guide}. So Jack reads the exact same description of how to change a light bulb that Charlie reads. And Jack, like Charlie, comprehends these instructions perfectly. Obviously, it is safe to assume that Jack knows how to change a light bulb after reading these instructions. This is an ordinary way of gaining knowledge-how. But how could we deny that Charlie comes to know how to change a light bulb after reading the very same instructions? The fact that Charlie, unlike Jack, is extremely lucky to read these instructions does not seem to be a reason to conclude that only Jack comes to know how to change a light bulb.
would follow that there is a good sense in which knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that.\textsuperscript{18}

S&W’s interpretation of this case is also strange given that their own account of knowledge-how tells us that Bob knows how to fly. Let me explain. The core of S&W’s account of knowledge-how was stated earlier in §1. But S&W also make two further, and important, claims about the nature of knowledge-how. Firstly, S&W (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 442–43; cf. also pp. 415–16) hold that all intentional actions “are employments of knowledge-how”. That is, they accept the following claim:

\[
(1) \text{ If } S \phi \text{ intentionally, } S \text{ knows how to } \phi
\]

Secondly, S&W infer from (1) a further claim concerning abilities, as their discussion of the ability hypothesis reply to the knowledge argument\textsuperscript{19} reveals:

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{18}] Jason Stanley explicitly denies that knowledge-how ascriptions are ambiguous in his “Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge” \textit{The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79} (2005): pp. 131–46 (see p. 133). Bengson and Moffett also deny that knowledge-how ascriptions are ambiguous (see Bengson and Moffett I, pp. 38–40). Brogaard does hold that ‘S knows how to φ’ ascriptions are ambiguous, as she claims that ‘John knows how to play the piano’ can be interpreted either as “saying that there is a w such that John knows that w is how John may play the piano or as saying that there is a w such that John knows that w is how one may play the piano” (Brogaard II, p. 47). But clearly, on either disambiguation, knowing how to play the piano is still a kind of knowledge-that.

\item [\textsuperscript{19}] S&W argue that their account of knowledge-how is inconsistent with the ability hypothesis reply to Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. This reply, given by David Lewis and Laurence Nemirov (amongst others), makes two claims about what happens to Mary when she leaves her famous black-and-white room: (1) Mary gains new knowledge-how; and, (2) Mary does not gain any new knowledge-that. S&W claim that if their account of knowledge-how is correct then (1) and (2) are inconsistent. I have argued elsewhere (“The Ability Hypothesis and The
For the ability to imagine an experience of red is clearly an ability to perform an intentional action. And we do find it very plausible that intentional actions are employments of knowledge-how. ... But if intentional actions are employments of knowledge-how then Mary’s acquisition of an ability to imagine an experience of red brings with it knowledge how to imagine red (S&W op. cit., pp. 442–3).]

So, S&W hold that if one has the ability to perform an action intentionally then one knows how to perform that action. That is, they accept the following claim:

\[(2) \text{ If S has the ability to } \phi \text{ intentionally, S knows how to } \phi^{20}\]

But then it is a necessary consequence of S&W’s full account of knowledge-how—and a plausible assumption—that Bob does know how to fly. The assumption is that Bob has the ability to fly a plane intentionally. And this is very plausible. After all, Bob passes the course that imparts this ability with “flying colours”. To emphasize the point, note that Joe has the ability to fly a plane intentionally as he exits his simulator. But then we must conclude that Bob also has this ability, for Joe and Bob are clearly equivalent with respect to their abilities to fly a plane.

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New Knowledge-how,” forthcoming in Noûs) that even if S&W’s account of knowledge-how is correct we can still consistently endorse versions of both (1) and (2)

\(^{20}\) This claim is consistent with S&W’s opposition to neo-Ryleanism as S&W (op cit., p. 416) explicitly deny the entailment in the other direction: “ascriptions of knowledge-how do not even entail ascriptions of the corresponding abilities”.

The issue here can be illustrated by noting that the following three claims form an inconsistent triad:

(2) If S has the ability to φ intentionally, S knows how to φ
(3) Bob has the ability to fly intentionally
(4) Bob does not know how to fly

S&W claim both that Bob does not know how to fly and they that having the ability to φ intentionally entails knowing how to φ; that is, they endorse both (2) and (4). However, (3) is true. It must be the case then that either (2) or (4) or both (2) and (4) are false. So, to maintain that Bob does not know how to fly S&W would have to deny (2), thereby denying a key commitment of their full account of knowledge-how.

Furthermore, if S&W are right, that having the ability to φ intentionally entails knowing how to φ, this is highly important in this context given that the following ability ascriptions are very plausible:

(5) At t₁ Charlie has the ability to change a light bulb intentionally
(6) At t₂ Lucy has the ability to juggle intentionally
(7) At t₃ Jodie has the ability to juggle intentionally

For if S&W are right that (2) is true then (5), (6) and (7) each entail the corresponding knowledge-how ascription, that is, they entail KH₁, KH₂ and KH₃ respectively.
Could S&W reply that while Charlie, Lucy and Jodie possess the ability to perform these actions they do not possess the ability to perform them intentionally? Perhaps with regard to (7), one might argue that to have the ability to juggle intentionally, Jodie would have to believe that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle. However, as mentioned earlier, at \( t_3 \) it would still seem to Jodie that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle. So one could convince Jodie to try to juggle that way that merely seems to her to be a way to juggle. And if she did try, she would likely succeed. In which case, I think the natural thing to say would be that Jodie not only juggled but that she did so intentionally.

In any case, even if one could resist (7) on these grounds, (5) and (6) seem straightforwardly true. It may be a necessary condition of S’s having the ability to \( \phi \) intentionally that there be some way \( w \) that is a way for S to \( \phi \) such that S believes that \( w \) is a way for S to \( \phi \). But it is surely not a necessary condition of S’s having the ability to \( \phi \) intentionally that such a belief must also be non-accidentally true and/or justified.\(^{21}\)

If the intellectualist is to deny any of these KH claims (or at least, KH.1 and KH2) then they must deny that having the ability to \( \phi \) intentionally entails knowing how to \( \phi \). Luckily, other intellectualists have identified plausible counterexamples to this entailment, as a means of arguing against the neo-Rylean view that to know how to \( \phi \) is to simply possess the ability to \( \phi \). For example, Bengson and Moffett\(^{22}\) present the following scenario—I will call it

\(^{21}\) Bengson and Moffett make a similar point in regard to S&W’s claim that having the ability to \( \phi \) intentionally entails knowing how to \( \phi \) (see Bengson and Moffett II, fn. 23).

\(^{22}\) My use of the term ‘neo-Ryleanism’ as a name for the view that to know how to \( \phi \) is to simply possess the ability to \( \phi \) is borrowed from Bengson and Moffett.
the salchow case—as an example where intuitively someone has the ability to $\phi$ intentionally but does not know how to $\phi$:

Suppose that Irina is seriously mistaken about how to perform a salchow. She believes incorrectly that the way to perform a salchow is to take off from the front outside of her skate, jump in the air, spin, and land on the front inside edge of her skate. (The correct sequence is to take off from the back inside edge and land on the back outside edge of the opposite foot after one or more rotations in the air.) However, Irina has a severe neurological abnormality that makes her act in ways that differ dramatically from how she actually thinks she is acting. Whenever she actually attempts to do a salchow (in accordance with her misconceptions) this abnormality causes her to reliably perform the correct sequence of moves. So, although she is seriously mistaken about how to perform a salchow, whenever she actually attempts to do a salchow (in accordance with her misconceptions) the abnormality causes Irina to perform the correct sequence of moves, and so she ends up successfully performing a salchow. Despite the fact that what she is doing and what she thinks she is doing come apart, she fails to notice the mismatch. In this case, it is clear that Irina is (reliably) able to do a salchow. However, due to her mistaken belief about how to perform the move, she cannot be said to know how to do a salchow (Bengson and Moffett I, p. 46).

Paul Snowdon also presents the following scenario—I will call it the man in a room case—as a counterexample to the claim that if one has the ability to $\phi$ then one knows how to $\phi$ (but it also seems to be a counterexample to the claim that if one has the ability to $\phi$ intentionally then one knows how to $\phi$):

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A man is in a room, which, because he has not explored it in the least, he does, as yet, not know how to get out of. In fact, there is an obvious exit which he can easily open. He is perfectly able to get out, he can get out, but does not know how to (as yet) (Snowdon ibid. p. 11).

There are plausible counterexamples then to (2). And if this is right then one can consistently deny KH1, KH2 and KH3 whilst accepting (5), (6) and (7). However, this is not yet a reason to think that any of these KH claims are false.

It is clear that in practice many subjects would have the intuition that the KH claims are correct. One line of response available to the intellectualist would be to claim that while the KH claims are intuitive they are nonetheless false. But if they are to deny these intuitive claims, the intellectualist owes us some explanation of why our intuitions about these cases are so systematically misleading.

Probably the most obvious explanation would be to claim that we somehow confuse the fact that the subjects in our putative counterexamples possess the relevant ability with their possessing the corresponding knowledge-how. Appealing to the idea that ability ascriptions implicate, but do not entail, the corresponding knowledge-how ascription, would be one way to develop such an argument. The explanation then of our intuitions regarding KH1, KH2 and KH3, would be that we confuse a conversational implicature with an entailment. For example, our intuition that Charlie knows how to change a light bulb is explained by the fact that we know that Charlie has the ability to change a light bulb and we mistakenly think that ‘S has the ability to φ’ entails ‘S knows how to φ’.
This strategy for explaining away our intuitions regarding the KH claims may appear promising. As the salchow and man in a room cases do seem to show that there is no entailment from ‘S has the ability to φ’ to ‘S knows how to φ’, even when S’s ability is an ability to φ intentionally. But presumably, in stereotypical or paradigmatic cases of someone’s having the ability to φ they will also know how to φ, in which case it seems reasonable to suppose that there is a ‘S has the ability to φ’ implicates ‘S knows how to φ’.

However, note that there is an inherent tension in this kind of response to our putative counterexamples. To establish that having the ability to φ does not entail knowing how to φ the intellectualist needs there to be clear cases where intuitively someone has the ability to φ but does not know how to φ. And there are such cases. But then why does our familiarity with the relevant implicature lead us to mistakenly have the intuition that KH1, KH2 and KH3 are true, when it obviously does not lead us to make the parallel mistake with regard to the salchow and man in a room cases? In both sets of cases the relevant subject has the ability to φ intentionally and, according to the intellectualist, does not know how to φ. The intellectualist then would have to provide a plausible explanation of this asymmetry that is also consistent with their interpretation of these cases. Perhaps there is some such explanation but I am not sure what it would be.

On the other hand, we can offer a natural explanation of this asymmetry in our intuitions, namely, that the subjects in the lucky light bulb, dogmatic hallucinator and non-dogmatic hallucinator cases know how to perform the

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24 Bengson and Moffett think that there is a stereotypical implicature in the other direction, from knowing how to φ to having the ability to φ. For further discussion of the notion of a stereotypical implicature see Bengson and Moffett I, p. 35.
relevant actions, whereas the subjects in the salchow and man in a room cases do not.

I also doubt that it is an essential feature of the counterexamples offered here that the subjects in these scenarios possess the ability to perform the relevant action. As intellectualists often point out, one can know how to $\phi$ without possessing the ability to $\phi$. For example, S&W (op. cit., p. 416) offer the case of “a master pianist who loses both her arms in a tragic car accident”. Intuitively, after such an accident the master pianist would still know how to play the piano even though she has lost her ability to do so. Again, such examples are cited by intellectualists’ as evidence against neo-Ryleanism, for they suggest that having the ability to $\phi$ is not a necessary condition for knowing how to $\phi$.

Bearing this point in mind, let us add an unfortunate twist to the lucky light bulb case. Namely, just after Charlie grasps the instructions in The Idiot’s Guide at $t_1$, his arms are removed (I will leave the details of how to your imagination). Otherwise, the case remains exactly the same. Does Charlie still know how to change a light bulb? As with the pianist case, I take it that the intuitive answer is yes. In which case, we still have a scenario where intuitively Charlie knows how to $\phi$, and the same reasons are still present for thinking that Charlie does not possess the kind of knowledge-that that such knowledge-how might be plausibly identified with. However, in this modified scenario, Charlie also lacks the ability to change a light bulb. So the intellectualist cannot dismiss the knowledge-how intuition here by claiming that we are merely confusing the fact that Charlie has the ability to change a light bulb with his knowing how to change a light bulb. And one could modify the dogmatic hallucinator and non-dogmatic hallucinator cases to achieve the same kind of result.
However, I think the more important point is simply that there are good reasons to be suspicious of such attempts to dismiss our intuitions regarding the KH claims. Consider the very examples intellectualists appeal to when arguing against neo-Ryleanism—the salchow and man in a room cases or S&W’s pianist case. As counterexamples to neo-Ryleanism, these cases are compelling. But the intuitive force of such examples suggests that we are quite capable of discerning the difference between knowing how to \( \phi \) and possessing the ability to \( \phi \). It seems implausible then to suppose that our intuitions about the KH claims are merely the result of our confusing the fact that a subject has the ability to \( \phi \) with their knowing how to \( \phi \).

There is no simple way to dismiss our intuitions about the KH claims. But intellectualism requires that we deny the KH claims, for we saw in §2 that denying the NKT claims is not a plausible response to our putative counterexamples. In the absence of some good way to dismiss our intuitions regarding the KH claims, I submit that that we should reject intellectualism.

4. TOWARD A NEW THEORY

I have argued that intellectualism is false. But what is knowledge-how if it is not a kind of knowledge-that? The most prominent alternative to intellectualism is neo-Ryleanism. However, neo-Ryleanism does not appear to be a viable alternative to intellectualism. The salchow and man in a room cases suggest that having the ability to \( \phi \) does not suffice for knowing how to \( \phi \), and examples like the pianist case suggest that having the ability to \( \phi \) is not necessary for knowing how to \( \phi \).
However, I think our discussion suggests a promising alternative to both intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism. According to this view, knowing how to \( \phi \) is a matter of standing in a relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation. The relevant relation is that S stands in to a proposition p, when it \textit{seems} to S that p is the case.

Importantly, this relation is not the belief relation. As mentioned earlier, it can seem to one that p even when one fails to believe that p. That is, believing that p is not a necessary condition for it seeming to one that p. In which case, seemings cannot be understood as merely some species of belief.

Also, the kind of seemings that are relevant to this new account of knowledge-how are not perceptual (or sensory) seemings. Paradigmatic cases of perceptual seemings include visual seemings, as when one looks at a Müller-Lyer figure and one’s visual experience presents the two horizontal lines as being unequal in length. Paradigmatic examples of non-perceptual seemings include intellectual seemings, as when one entertains the proposition that if P then not not P, and then one “sees” that it is true.

Intellectual seemings are often contrasted not only with perceptual seemings, but also with seemings that are grounded in introspection, imagination, or

\[25\] Of course, this is not to say that there aren’t important connections between seemings and belief. As is often noted, seemings typically incline one to believe their propositional content. Although, as William Tolhurst points out [in his “Seemings,” \textit{American Philosophical Quarterly}, 35 (1998), p. 297], seemings do more than just incline one to believe, for when it seems to one that p “one experiences believing [that p] to be demanded or required.” Furthermore, “seemings have the feel of truth, the feel of a state whose content reveals how things really are” (\textit{ibid.}, pp. 298-9).
memory. In which case, the class of non-perceptual seemings includes, but is not exhausted by, the class of intellectual seemings. In claiming that the kind of seemings relevant to our new account of knowledge-how are non-perceptual, I intend to remain neutral on the question of whether the seemings in question should be characterised as purely intellectual seemings, or as non-perceptual seemings (because they might be seen as essentially relying on introspection, imagination or memory).

Bearing these points in mind, that seemings are not beliefs and that the kind of seemings at issue here are non-perceptual seemings, we can introduce a new analysis of knowledge-how:

*The Seeming Analysis*

S knows how to φ if, and only if, there is some way w that is a way to φ such that:

(c) It (non-perceptually) seems to S that w is a way to φ

(d) S entertains w under a practical mode of presentation

The motivation for the seeming analysis is that, in all of our counterexamples to intellectualism, there is intuitively still some way w for the subject to perform the relevant action φ such that it seems to the subject that w is a way to φ. It seems to Charlie that w₁ is a way for him to change a light bulb even though his belief that w₁ is a way for him to change a light bulb is only accidentally true. It

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26 As George Bealer says (*op. cit.*, p. 102), intellectual seemings are seemings that one can have “in the absence of any particular sensory (imaginative) or introspective experiences.” For a similar construal of intellectual seemings see also Michael Huemer’s *Ethical Intuitionism* (New York: Palgrave, 2005), and Joel Pust’s *Intuitions as Evidence* (New York: Garland, 2000).
seems to Lucy that \( w_2 \) is a way for her to juggle even though her belief that \( w_2 \) is way for her to juggle is defeated. And as noted earlier, it still seems to Jodie that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle even though she does not believe that \( w_3 \) is a way for her to juggle.

Of course, the point here is not that if Charlie (for example) were to simply observe someone else changing a light bulb at \( t_1 \) then it would still seem to him that that way is a way to change a light bulb. This is true, but this would only be a perceptual seeming. Rather, the point is that if at \( t_1 \) Charlie were to entertain the proposition that \( w_1 \) is a way to \( \phi \), or if he were to simply think of \( w_1 \), it would still seem to him that \( w_1 \) is a way to \( \phi \). This is the sense then in which this seeming is non-perceptual, for it is a seeming that Charlie can have in the absence of his having any particular kind of perceptual experience.\(^{27}\)

The seeming analysis accords then with our intuitions that the KH claims are correct. Furthermore, the seeming analysis also accords with our intuitions about the salchow and man in a room cases. There is a series of actions such that it seems to Irina that that series of actions is a way to perform the salchow. But this series of actions is not a way to perform the salchow. The seeming analysis rightly predicts then that Irina does not know how to perform the salchow. And while there is a way for the man in a room to exit the room it does not seem to the man that that way is a way to exit the room, as he is not even aware yet of this way to exit the room. Furthermore, the seeming analysis accords with our intuitions about the pianist case. For even after her accident, it

\(^{27}\) As mentioned already, whether this kind of seeming can be had in the absence of Charlie having any particular kind of introspective, imaginative, or mnemonic experience is an issue I wish to remain neutral on here.
will still seem to the pianist that that way she used to play the piano is a way to play the piano.

It appears that across a diverse range of cases, the seeming analysis accords with our intuitions better than both intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism. Unlike intellectualism, it accords with our intuitions about the lucky light bulb, dogmatic hallucinator and non-dogmatic hallucinator cases. And unlike neo-Ryleanism, the seeming analysis accords with our intuitions about the salchow, man in a room and unfortunate pianist cases.

Both conditions (c) and (d) of our seeming analysis require some explanation. Starting with (d), why include the parallel of S&W’s condition (b) in our new analysis of knowledge-how? S&W include (b) because without it their analysis would clearly not describe a sufficient condition for knowing how to $\phi$. Intuitively, there can be contexts in which one fails to know how to $\phi$ even though there is some way $w$ such that one knows that $w$ is a way for one to $\phi$. Likewise, one could presumably fail to know how to $\phi$ even though there is some way $w$ such that it non-perceptually seems to one that $w$ is a way for one to $\phi$. S&W’s condition (b) is intended to be a solution to this problem. Insofar as this fix works for their intellectualist account of knowledge-how, the same fix will work for our seeming analysis of knowledge-how. If practical modes of presentation cannot be used to solve this problem then we could appeal to other intellectualist strategies for addressing the same issue.\(^{28}\)

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\(^{28}\) For example, Bengson and Moffet attempt to address this problem by requiring that to know how to $\phi$ not only must there be some way $w$ such that one knows that $w$ is a way to $\phi$, but one must also minimally understand $w$, see (Bengson and Moffett I: pp. 50–3).
Obviously, with regard to (c), one can know how to \( \phi \) even when it does not *occurrently* seem to one that some way \( w \) is a way to \( \phi \)—for example, when one is asleep. The seeming analysis will not be plausible then unless one can satisfy (c) even when it does not occurrently seems to one that some way \( w \) is a way to \( \phi \). But the idea that an ascription of the form ‘It seems to \( S \) that \( p \)’ could be true of \( S \) even when it does not occurrently seem to \( S \) that \( p \), might initially appear strange. Typically, philosophers are interested in such ascriptions only insofar as they refer to occurrent and conscious seemings. For example, philosophers concerned with the nature of philosophical intuition are often concerned with the kind of occurent state one is in when, on considering a Gettier scenario (say), it seems to one that the subject in this scenario does not know that the relevant proposition is true.

But there is also a natural interpretation of ‘It seems to \( S \) that \( p \)’ ascriptions whereby they can be satisfied by non-occurent states. Suppose that during a conversation about the ethical views of our friends I assert, “It seems to Bill that eating meat is wrong”. In such a context, it is no objection to my claim to point out that Bill is currently in a deep dreamless sleep. For my claim is naturally interpreted as being satisfied by some standing, or non-occurent, state of Bill, rather than some occurrent state of it seeming to Bill that eating meat is wrong. And presumably, this non-occurent state is one that consists (at least partly) in the disposition for it to occurrently seem to Bill that eating meat is wrong, in certain relevant conditions.\(^{29}\)

\(^{29}\) Philosophers who identify philosophical intuitions with seemings typically deny that intuitions are dispositional states. It is worth emphasizing that this denial is consistent with the idea of dispositional seemings appealed to here. I am not claiming that occurrent seemings can be analysed as some kind of dispositional state (indeed, I think it is clear that they cannot be so
Likewise, condition (c) should be understood in such a way that in order to satisfy (c) it suffices that it seem to one that \( w \) is a way to \( \phi \), in this non-occurrent sense of ‘It seems to S that p’; where for it non-occurrenty seem to one that some way \( w \) is a way to \( \phi \) is to be in a state that consists (at least partly) in the disposition for it to occurrently (and non-perceptually) seem to one that \( w \) is a way to \( \phi \).

The seeming analysis is something of an intermediate position between Ryle’s own account of knowledge-how and intellectualism. The seeming account is related to intellectualism because it claims that knowing how to do something is a matter of either standing in, or being disposed to stand in, an intentional relation to a true proposition. Of course, unlike intellectualism, the relevant relation is not the knowledge-that relation. Rather, it is the relation of it occurrently seeming to one that some proposition is true.

The seeming account is related to Ryle’s account of knowledge-how because both accounts appeal to dispositional states. Neo-Ryleanism is often attributed to Ryle, and indeed some things he says could be seen as supporting such an ascription. Still, it is not clear that Ryle did identify knowing how to \( \phi \) with the corresponding ability to \( \phi \). What is clear, however, is that Ryle identified

analysed). Rather, I am claiming that as well as occurrent seemings we can quite naturally talk of dispositional seemings, where these are understood to be dispositions to have an occurrent seeming. A similar distinction applies to the related notion of understanding. As David Hunter notes [in his “Understanding and Belief” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998), p. 559–80], there is a natural and useful distinction to be made between states of occurrent understanding and dispositions to be in such occurrent states, what he calls “dispositions to understand.” As with seeming ascriptions, I think it is clear that ascriptions of understanding can be satisfied not only by states of occurrent understanding, but also by non-occurrent states, that consist (at least partly) in dispositions to be in occurrent states of understanding.
knowing how to $\phi$ with the possession of a complex of dispositions.\(^\text{30}\) Similarly, the seeming account allows that one can know how to $\phi$ in virtue of being in the relevant kind of dispositional state.

In setting out his account of knowledge-how, Ryle mainly appealed to dispositions to perform various kinds of observable actions. Contrastingly, the seeming account appeals to a disposition to be in a certain kind of conscious and intentional state. In this respect, the seeming account parts ways with at least the letter of Ryle’s account of knowledge-how. Exactly how far it departs from the spirit of Ryle’s account is difficult to say. While Ryle mainly appeals to behavioural dispositions when setting out his account of knowledge-how, sometimes he also appeals to dispositions to be in certain cognitive or phenomenal states. Ryle’s account of knowledge-how then is more complex than his reputation as a philosophical behaviourist would suggest.\(^\text{31}\)

\(^{30}\) Or, as Ryle would say, it is a single disposition “the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogenous.” (Ryle II, p. 44). Brian Weatherson, in an entry on his blog “Thoughts Arguments and Rants”, claims that Ryle is only committed to this view, and not neo-Ryleanism and, therefore, the standard counterexamples to neo-Ryleanism simply do not apply to Ryle (see, http://tar.weatherson.org/2006/07/22/ryle-on-knowing-how/#comments). S&W (op cit: 411) attribute both this view and neo-Ryleanism to Ryle, as they claim that according to Ryle “knowledge-how is ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions.” That is, they take Ryle to be committed to both of the following identity claims: (i) to know how to $\phi$ is to possess the ability to $\phi$; and, (ii) to know how to $\phi$ is to possess a complex of dispositions. This explains why S&W take their counterexamples to (i), like the pianist case, to be counterexamples to Ryle’s account of knowledge-how. Like Weatherson, I am not convinced that Ryle is committed to (i), but even if he is, it seems to me that Ryle would lose little if, in response to the standard counterexamples to (i), he were to simply reject (i) whilst retaining (ii).

\(^{31}\) For discussion of these complexities, in particular with regard to Ryle’s dispositional account of belief, see: Eric Schitzwgebel “A Phenomenal Dispositional Account of Belief” Noûs 36:2 (2002), pp. 259–60. See also Brian Weatherson’s “Doing Philosophy with Words,” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. Whether these complexities in Ryle’s views are consistent with his
Obviously, much work remains to be done to develop this alternative account of knowledge-how but this work will have to be left to another occasion. The role of the seeming account here is to open up the possibility of promising alternatives to both intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism. In the literature, intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism are normally the only accounts of knowledge-how that are discussed. This situation can lead to a tendency to regard arguments against either account as being arguments, by default, for the other. The seeming account emphasizes the fact that we should not regard the arguments against intellectualism given here as being arguments for neo-Ryleanism. Furthermore, it shows us that even if knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that, it could still be the case that knowledge-how is propositional in nature. In looking beyond the standard dichotomy of intellectualism and neo-Ryleanism, we may just find a more adequate account of knowledge-how.\footnote{I presented this paper to audiences at The Australian National University and The University of St Andrews. I would like to thank both audiences for their helpful criticisms, questions and suggestions. I am also greatly indebted to John Bengson, Berit Brogaard, Andy Egan, Jonathan Ichikawa, Jonathan Schaffer, Nicholas Silins, Daniel Stoljar and, in particular, David Chalmers, for feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.}