Patrick is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Epistemic Warrant Project at ANU (Aug 2007 - Aug 2008). He is also a permanent lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at St. Andrews and Associate Director of the Arché Research Centre. He received his PhD from St. Andrews in 2002. His main research interests are in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and epistemology. He has a particular interest in vagueness, the liar paradox, indeterminacy in general, contextualism, relativism, minimalism, realism, truth, anti-luck epistemology, self-knowledge, basic knowledge, discrimination, assertion, belief, representation, and, the nature of time.

Published and forthcoming papers: (Comments welcome).

‘Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming 2009. (Penultimate draft)

‘Hold the Context Fixed, Vagueness Still Remains’ (with Jonas Åkerman), in Dietz and Moruzzi (eds) Cuts and Clouds: New Essays on Vagueness, forthcoming 2009. (Draft)

‘Contextualist Theories of Vagueness: a Critical Survey’ (with Jonas Åkerman), Philosophy Compass, Blackwells, forthcoming 2008/2009.

‘Vagueness and Non-Indexical Contextualism’ (with Jonas Åkerman), in New Waves in the Philosophy of Language, edited by S. Sawyer, Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming 2008/2009.

‘Indeterminate Truth’, in Truth and Its Deformities, edited by Peter French, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, September 2008. (Final draft)

‘On what it is to be in a quandary’, Synthese, 2008 (SpringerLink).

'Contextualism about Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 2005 (Blackwells Synergy).

'Vagueness: A Minimal Theory', Mind, Volume 112, Issue 446, March 2003 (abstract, Ingenta Link, Oxford Journals).

'Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox', American Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, 38: 2 (abstract or pdf).

Edited collections:

Williamson on Knowledge, (co-edited with Duncan Pritchard), Oxford: OUP, forthcoming.

Truth and Realism, (co-edited with Michael P Lynch), Oxford: OUP, 2006.

Under review or in progress: (Comments welcome)

‘Our Cognitive Homes’ (Draft).

‘The Open Future’ (ms available on request).

‘Assertion and Belief’ to appear in Essays on Assertion, edited by J. Brown and H. Cappelen. (In progress).

‘Deflationism and Indeterminacy’, to appear in New Waves in the Philosophy of Truth, edited by Nikolaj Pedersen and Cory Wright, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009/10. (In progress)

‘Observational Properties and Observational Knowledge’ (ms available on request)

‘Knowledge and Warrant’ (in progress)