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Last modified 4 Jul 08
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. Philosophy Program
RSSS, ANU
Philsoc

The ANU Philosophy Society is a group of academics and graduate students in Philosophy and other disciplines, who meet regularly, giving seminars and discussing them.

All philosophy events at ANU, including Philsoc talks, are announced on the philsoc mailing list. Click here to subscribe to the philsoc mailing list.

Also, a Google Calendar of philosophy activities at ANU is maintained by Ole Koksvik here.


Submit a paper

You can submit a paper by e-mailing one of the Philsoc convenors, currently Jens Christian Bjerring () and Weng Hong Tang ().

Upcoming Papers

Tuesday, July 15th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Sara J. Bernstein (Arizona)
Overdetermination Problems
Tuesday, August 5th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Philipp Koralus (Princeton)
Attitude reports without ambiguity and hidden-indexicals
Tuesday, August 12th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Angela Mendelovici (Princeton)
Getting Truth Conditions from Narrow Content
Tuesday, August 19th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Conrad Heilmann (LSE)
TBA

Recent Papers

Tuesday, July 1st, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
David Bourget (RSSS)
Representationalism: The Easy Way
Wednesday, June 25th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Jens Christian Bjerring (RSSS)
Provability and Nontrivial Impossible Worlds (Mid-term review)
Tuesday, June 24th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Weng Hong Tang (RSSS)
Belief, Knowledge, and Credence (Mid-term review)
Tuesday, June 17th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Dan Giberman (Stanford)
Gloppy Trope Bundles
Tuesday, June 10th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Brian Kim (Columbia)
Expressions of fallibility
Tuesday, June 3rd, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room B
Leon Leontyev (RSSS)
What Wright may or may not be saying - though, at any rate, ought to be saying - about transmission failure
Tuesday, May 27th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Marius Dumitru (University of Oxford)
On Cognitive Phenomenology
Tuesday, May 20th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Joe Salerno (St. Louis)
A New Paradox of Happiness
Tuesday, May 13th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Mike Bruno (Arizona)
Action and Visual Consciousness
Tuesday, May 6th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Declan Smithies (RSSS)
The Epistemic Significance of Consciousness
Tuesday, April 29th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Ben Blumson (Sydney)
Mental Maps
Tuesday, April 22nd, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Federico Luzzi (St. Andrews)
Luck and Deductive Inference
Tuesday, April 15th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Wolfgang Schwarz (RSSS)
A Bunch of Remarks in Defence of A Priori Physicalism
Tuesday, April 8th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room E
Paul Dimmock (St. Andrews)
Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Two Epistemological Problems
Tuesday, March 18th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Douglas Edwards (St Andrews)
How (and why) we should be pluralists about truth
Tuesday, March 11th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Stuart Crutchfield (University of Glasgow)
Phenomenal Unity, Introspective Unity, and the Big-Numb-Arm Problem for Spatial Unity
Tuesday, March 4th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Grant Reaber (CMU)
Why Are There Three Kinds of Models for Modality *De Re*?
Tuesday, February 26th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Samantha Brennan (UWO)
Moral Gaps: Thresholds for Rights and Threshold for Options
Tuesday, February 19th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Wolfgang Schwarz (RSSS)
Believing in Afterlife -- Conditionalization in a Changing World
Tuesday, February 5th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Daniel Friedrich (RSSS)
Does Belief Motivate?
Tuesday, January 29th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Patrick Greenough (RSSS)
Our Cognitive Home
Tuesday, January 22nd, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Jonathan Schaffer (RSSS)
The Internal Relatedness of All Things
Thursday, January 17th, 4:00pm
Coombs Seminar Room C
Brent Madison (UCL)
Epistemic Internalism, Justification, and the Truth-Connection