1. Published or forthcoming
Shadows
of constitution (The Monist,
forthcoming in 2007)
Abstract: Mainstream
metaphysics has been preoccupied by inquiring into the nature of
majorkinds of entities, like objects, properties and events, while
avoiding minor entities, like shadows or holes. However, one might want
to hope that dealing with such minor entities could be profitable for
even solving puzzles about major entities. I propose a new ontological
puzzle, the Shadow of Constitution Puzzle, incorporating the old puzzle
of material constitution, with shadows in the role ofthe minor entity
to guide our approach to the issues involved. I then analyze the
standard answers to the original puzzle of constitution, in their role
as potential solutions to the new puzzle. Finally, I discuss three
views that can solve the proposed puzzle.
Abstract: The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of
the
most discussed mind-body puzzles. A solution to it is usually put forth
either
as an argument for one mind-body view or another, or as a way to
compatibilize
such a view with the most acceptable assumptions behind the problem.
There
have been two main approaches to this problem. The first is put forth
as
an argument for reductive physicalism, and implicitly against
nonreductive
physicalism and a fortiori against mind-body dualism. The second
approach
is less combative, and is concerned with saving nonreductive
physicalism
from the potential danger of either mental-physical overdetermination,
or
mental epiphenomenalism. However, there has been a general agreement
among
philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some
form
of physicalism, that the exclusion problem cannot be escaped by the
dualist.
I argue that a proper understanding of dualism --its form, commitments,
and
intuitions—makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from the dualist
perspective.
The paper proposes a dualist approach and solution to the exclusion
problem,
based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are
neither
fine-grained (Jaegwon Kim), nor coarse-grained (Donald Davidson), but
medium-grained,
namely, parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory
of
contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for
which
the problem of exclusion does not arise.
Aristotelian Nonsubstantial Particulars
(Philosophical Writings 26, Summer 2004, 3-15.)
Comments: Discusses two views on Aristotle’s notion
of nonsubstantial particulars in the Categories
– the view that these
should be considered as tropes versus the view that they should be
understood as most determinate universals – and argues, on the basis of
a new interpretation of Aristotle’s definition of inherence, for
Aristotle as a tropista.
Physical Constituents of Qualia
(Philosophical Studies, 116,
November 2003, pp.103-131)
2. Drafts
Powers and the
Mind-Body Problem
The paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument
for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of
properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers
essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical
but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a
metaphysical (understood as broadly logical) possibility, but
irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed
attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean
approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality. Finally, the
application of the powers-based essentialist view about properties to
the analysis of conceivability arguments has the virtue of illuminating
some unmapped ontological and epistemological consequences, some of
which are relevant for a defence of the view against some traditional
objections.
A Posteriori
Physicalism: a New Interpretation
Most, if not all philosophers modulo myself think that A-C defines a
posteriori physicalism and that D is to be embraced, if one endorses
A-C:
A. The notion of necessitation that is required by
physicalism is not a priori necessitation of all truths by the totality
of physical truths.
B. There are truths (those about qualia) that are not
a priori necessitated by the totality of physical truths.
C. Physicalism is true.
D. Zombies are conceivable, but not possible.
I will argue that a posteriori physicalism could and should be
understood in close analogy with Kripke’s examples of a posteriori
necessities, e.g.” Water is H2O”, and if so, then we will end up with a
view that denies A, B, and D. We end up with a posteriori physicalism
with a priori entailment of all the truths by the totality of physical
truths.
Composition as Causation
Subscribing to thesis of
composition
as identity, first proposed
by Donald Baxter and David Lewis, implies accepting the extensionality
principle of standard mereology. However, even though there has been a
growing number of arguments for denying extensionality, an alternative
understanding of
composition
has not been proposed. I propose the thesis of
composition as
causation. I argue that,
unlike identity,
causation
has the required features to make it fit for cases when extensionality
is denied, like that of material constitution. I consider some elements
of a plausible theory of
causation
that may count
as prima
facie reasons against the appropriateness of
composition as
a species of
causation and
show that the thesis is defensible.
3. Other
Physicalism and Consciousness. A Defense of
Commonsense Functionalism. (Ph.D. thesis)
Comments: Discussion of qualia
objections to physicalism. Criticism of a posteriori physicalism.
Defense of commonsense functionalism, without subscribing to a
physical/mental identity thesis. Proposal of a new functionalist thesis
regarding the mind/brain relation, called ‘functional integration
thesis’.
Sample draft chapter. (I decided to keep this
draft of chapter four, as it appears on many online search engine
directories, e.g. google, dmoz, etc.)
Chalmers's
Zombie Argument
The thesis in its final version is available at http://www.ceu.hu/phil/defenses.html
